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AbstrAct
I examine the importance of fiscal policy in stabilizing the Euro Area economy and 
the degree of interaction with monetary policy. The results provide solid evidence of a 
common fiscal reaction in the monetary union despite the lack of a formal fiscal union. 
I identify area-wide shocks and find statistically significant (endogenous) responses 
of fiscal policies to shocks. I also find strong evidence for interactions between fiscal-
and monetary policy. Said that, the nature of interactions depends very much on the 
shocks that hit the economy. At the same time, the way the two fiscal policies interact 
with monetary policy is also different and independent of each other. Furthermore, the 
spending multiplier is higher than the tax multiplier. Nonetheless, their relative efficacy 
has changed over time, with the spending (tax) multiplier falling (rising) since the onset 
of the Great Recession. To conclude, there are considerable differences in the nature of 
Euro Area monetary-fiscal interactions compared to the US. Not only are the impulse 
responses to different shocks significantly different, but also the fiscal multipliers vary a 
lot. Keynesian (or spending-oriented) fiscal policy is more effective in expanding output 
in the Euro Area while tax reductions are more effective in the US.
¿Qué es el estrés Fiscal en la Zona euro? evidencia a partir de un modelo 
estructural monetario y Fiscal
resumen
El artículo estudia la importancia de la política fiscal en la estabilización de la economía 
de la Zona Euro y el grado de interacción con la política monetaria. Los resultados 
ofrecen evidencia sólida de una reacción fiscal común en la unión monetaria a pesar de 
que formalmente no existe una unión fiscal. Se identifican los choques a nivel de la zona 
y se encuentra que las respuestas (endógenas) de las políticas fiscales a esos choques son 
estadísticamente significativas. Asimismo se encuentra evidencia fuerte de la interacción 
entre las políticas fiscal y monetaria. No obstante, la naturaleza de esa interacción depende 
mucho del tipo de los choques. Además, la forma en que cada uno de los dos tipos de 
política fiscal interactúa con la política monetaria es diferente e independiente de la otra. 
Adicionalmente el multiplicador del gasto es mayor que el de los impuestos; sin embargo, 
su relativa eficacia ha variado en el tiempo, con el multiplicador del gasto (impuesto) 
cayendo (aumentando) desde el comienzo de la Gran Recesión. Finalmente, se hallan 
diferencias considerables en la naturaleza de las interacciones de las políticas fiscal y 
monetaria entre la zona euro y los Estados Unidos. Aparte de que los impulso respuestas 
a los diferentes choques son significativamente diferentes, los multiplicadores fiscales 
varían demasiado. La política fiscal keynesiana (u orientada al gasto) es más efectiva 
en expandir la actividad económica en la Zona Euro mientras que las reducciones de 
impuestos son más efectivas en los Estados Unidos.
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1. Introduction
The recent wave of austerity-focused fiscal policies in 
the Euro Area (henceforth EA) have casted doubts on the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy to counter busts and reduce 
economic uncertainty. The heavy focus on dynamically 
sustainable government budgets has both reduced the 
space and scope for governments to use fiscal policy in 
a discretionary manner, leaving room for rule-based 
fiscal policy-decisions. Moreover, in an environment of 
unconventional monetary policy, it is even harder to argue 
for the merits of conducting expansionary fiscal policy.
In the EA, there is the additional institutional 
complexity. While there is a unique monetary policy, the 
fiscal policy competence is still national and very diverse 
across the area member states. Besides, the institutional 
arrangements around the decision-making on fiscal policy 
are heterogeneous. While in fiscally conservative countries 
such as Germany, the decisions on government spending, 
revenues, and debt are almost apolitical and rule-based, 
in southern European countries such as Greece or Italy, 
they are entirely influenced by the political cycle, political 
interests and are highly susceptible to short-termism. As 
a result, the specific content of the spending-and revenue 
plans, the horizon of such policies, and the role of debt 
sustainability in constraining such decisions are very 
diverse across the member states.
Despite these large discrepancies, there is a rising 
interest in exploring whether there exists a common core 
in the fiscal policy-making in EA. In particular, is there 
a fiscal unity, either as a result of spill-overs from the 
monetary union, or as a result of (voluntary) convergence 
towards a fiscal paradigm? In other words, have criteria 
under the Maastricht Treaty aiming at fiscal prudency, the 
choice for German fiscal conservatism over the Southern 
European preference for fiscal discretion, or even the late 
austerity measures lead to the emergence of a common 
fiscal response despite the lack of a formal fiscal union? 
In the context of a possible future fiscal union, these 
questions are highly relevant, both from an academic and 
policy-focused optic.
But, beyond these European affairs, there are two 
other pressing concerns regarding fiscal policies and their 
impacts. The first (previously explored by Fragetta and 
Kirsanova (2010), Rossi and Zubairy (2011), and Gerba 
and Hauzenberger (2014), albeit mostly for the US) is the 
importance of including monetary policy actions for fiscal 
policy estimates, and the role of (implicit) monetary-
fiscal interactions for economic stability. In particular, 
how stabilising is fiscal policy in a world of rule-based 
(conventional) monetary policy compared to a world of 
highly-expansionary bounded (unconventional) monetary 
policy? Is fiscal policy equally effective, or is fiscal 
expansion more effective when monetary policy is bound 
by the zero-lower-bound? Along the same lines, there is 
an increasing curiosity in understanding the impact of 
economic (and financial) uncertainty on their joint policy 
effectiveness. Here, the European case is especially 
relevant since EA has experienced both uncertainties since 
the onset of the Great Recession. Initially the uncertainty 
came from the financial sector. However, as concerns 
regarding the sustainability of budgets for several southern 
European economies rose, the uncertainty switched 
mainly to (macro)economic. What’s more, the bail-out of 
many banks in the EA meant that the nexus between the 
fiscal-economic-financial aspects became even tighter.
The current paper attempts to answer some of these 
concerns. In particular, I attempt to provide answers on 
the existence of a common fiscal policy in the EA since 
1980’s. whether and how these have interacted with 
monetary policy, the degree of effectiveness of fiscal 
policies in normal vs. turbulent (or uncertain) times. To 
answer these questions, I cast our fiscal, monetary and 
macroeconomic variables in a Structural Bayesian Vector 
Autoregressive (S-BVAR) framework and model the 
structure using theory-based sign-restrictions discussed 
in Gerba and Hauzenberger (2014). I estimate the model 
using the penalty function-based approach instead of the 
pure exclusion-based one used in many models with sign-
restrictions. I opt for this approach because it is much 
more information-intensive, data-driven, and holistic.
On the questions regarding a common fiscal reaction 
(or response) in the EA, I find affirmative evidence. I 
identify EA-wide shocks and find statistically significant 
(endogenous) responses of fiscal policies to shocks. While 
spending policy responses are truly discretionary and 
independent, I find that tax responses are highly cycle-
driven and dependent. I also find significant evidence 
for interactions between fiscal-and monetary policy. 
Said that, the nature of interactions depends very much 
on the shocks that hit the economy. While for a spending 
and monetary policy shock they act as substitutes, they 
act as compliments for a business cycle shock. At the 
same time, the way the two fiscal policies interact with 
monetary policy is also different and independent of each 
other. On the effectiveness of fiscal policies, we find that 
the spending multiplier is higher than the tax multiplier. 
Nonetheless, their relative efficacy has changed over 
time, with the spending (tax) multiplier falling (rising) 
since the onset of the Great Recession. I also show that 
it is crucial to include government debt in the estimation 
of monetary-fiscal interactions. Failing to recognize the 
debt channel of fiscal-and monetary policies will result 
in misinterpretations of the estimates. To conclude, there 
are considerable differences in the nature of monetary-
fiscal interactions between the EA and the US. Not only 
are the impulse responses to different shocks significantly 
different between the two economies, but also the fiscal 
multipliers vary a lot. Standard Keynesian (or spending-
oriented) fiscal policy is more effective in expanding 
output in the Euro Area while tax reductions are more 
effective in the US.
     23Ensayos sobrE Política Económica 
VolumEn 36, núm. 85 • Edición EsPEcial dE 2018
The paper makes four important contributions. First, 
it studies the question of monetary-fiscal interactions from 
an empirical perspective. Most of the literature, even in 
the US, has generally been based on DSGE models (or 
similar). The number of empirical studies on this topic are 
fewer (some of the exceptions are the studies cited above), 
and even more so for the EA. Second, as far as I am aware, 
there is no other paper that examines fiscal policy, fiscal 
multipliers and policy interactions in EA stretching as 
far back as in this paper. The sample period covered here 
covers important episodes such as the Great Stagflation, 
Great Moderation, Great Recession, the introduction of 
the Single Market and later the Euro, and unconventional 
monetary and fiscal policy. Third, I separately examine 
spending and tax multipliers, and systematically compare 
those to individual member state estimates found in the 
literature. Most of the studies on EA either treat the two 
multipliers as one or estimate only one of the multipliers 
(Alloza et al, 2017), use a much shorter sample period, or 
produce biased estimates by ignoring the interaction with 
monetary policy. On top, there are many more studies 
that examine the multipliers of the individual member 
states than for the entire EA. Fourth and last, I apply a 
robust identification scheme to jointly identify fiscal-and-
monetary policy shocks in an econometric framework. 
Besides Rossi and Zubairy (2011), Franta et al (2012), and 
Gerba and Hauzenberger (2014), I am not aware of other 
studies using the full empirical identification strategy to 
examine interactions. Different to these papers, however, 
I apply this framework on EA, meanwhile they do so for 
the US, or other countries.
2 Econometric approach
In the following sections, I will briefly describe the 
econometric method used to estimate the policies jointly 
in a macroeconomic structural BVAR, based on sign 
restrictions. Full technical details can be found in the 
Appendix.
2.1 VAR models
I follow Uhlig (2005) and Mountford and Uhlig 
(2009) in defining our BVAR model. Further details can 
be found in the appendix. I start with a generic reduced-
form VAR model:
Y
t
 = B
0
 + B1Yt–1 + B2Yt–2 …+ BjYt–j + ut (1)
where Y
t
 is an mx1 vector of data at date t = 1 – j, 
…..T, B
0
 is a constant of size mx1, Bj are mxm coefficient 
matrices and u
t
 is a one-step ahead prediction error with 
Σ = E ut'ut⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ , its variance-covariance matrix.
Let xi, i = 1,…m be the normalized eigenvectors of 
Σ and λi, i = 1,… m be the corresponding eigenvalues. 
In addition let a be a vector. Then there are coefficients 
ai,i = 1,…m ( Σ i=1m α i2 = 1 ) such that:
a = Σ i=1m α i λi( )xi  (2)
Vector a is thus an impulse vector, i. e. it can be 
shown that there exists A such that AA ̀=Σ and so that a 
is a column of A. In this vector, there are m –1 degrees of 
freedom in picking an impulse vector, and so they cannot 
be arbitrarily long.1
Next, we wish to compute an impulse response given 
the impulse vector a. Let a = [a´,0
1, m (l-1)]´, B is the VAR 
coefficient matrix, and
Γ = ′BIm l−1( ) 0m l−1( ),m
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
and compute rk,j = (Γ
ka)j, k = 0, 1, 2… to get the response 
of variable j at horizon k. The variance of the k-step 
ahead forecast error of the impulse vector a is obtained 
by simply squaring its impulse responses. Moreover, 
summing over all aj, with aj being the j-th column of some 
matrix A (A;A = Σ) delivers the total variance of the k-step 
ahead forecast error. Finally, we assume that the errors u 
are independent and normally distributed.
The exact content of our impulse response vector to 
each and every shock will be defined below. The four 
fundamental shocks we consider are: spending, taxes, 
monetary policy, and output (or business cycle).
2.2	 Identification	scheme
I use sign restrictions, summarized in Table 1, and 
outlined in Gerba and Hauzenberger (2014) to identify 
jointly four orthogonal shocks: a business cycle shock 
which increases output and taxes; a monetary policy 
shock which increases the interest rate and decreases 
inflation and output; a spending shock which increases 
spending, debt and output; and a tax shock which 
increases taxes and decreases debt and output. All 
restrictions must hold for one quarter, except for the 
responses of the variables which are directly associated 
to the shock (e.g. tax shock on taxes), which must hold 
for four quarters. Having somewhat longer restrictions 
here rules out transitory effects.
The theoretical considerations behind our choices 
are relatively uncontroversial and consistent with most 
dynamic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that 
include monetary-fiscal interactions as well as Keynesian 
aggregate supply and demand diagrams.2 However, I did 
1 Cauchy-Schwarz inequality implies that a⏐⏐ ⏐⏐ ⏐⏐ ⏐⏐⏐ ⏐≤ i=1m 2i xi .
2 Canova and Pappa (2007) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009) apply 
a similar identification scheme to study the effects of fiscal policy, 
and Chadha, Corrado and Sun (2010) among others, apply sign 
restrictions in a monetary policy framework.
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not want to be too restrictive in my choice of restrictions 
following just one DSGE model, since that would reduce 
the marginal contribution of data to my model. There is an 
intrinsic trade-off in choosing the sign restrictions, similar 
in general to Bayesian estimation. On one hand, tight sign 
restrictions improve identification and reduces the model 
space (or removes undesired models). On the other, it 
constraints the data input in the estimation procedure and 
strains the algorithm. Hence, there is an important balance 
to strike. I therefore choose restrictions that are in line with 
many (if not most) structural models including monetary-
fiscal interactions, but allow sufficient flexibility to allow 
the data to determine the best-fitting model.
Table 1 
Imposed Signs on the Impulse Responses
Spending
Net
Taxes
Debt Output Inflation
Interest 
Rate
Spending 
shock
 
+
 
+
 
+
Tax shock
 
+
 −  −
Business 
cycle 
shock
 
+
 
+
Monetary 
shock
 −  −
 
+
Note: A blank entry indicates no restriction on the specific combination of shock 
and response. For the estimations without debt in the model, debt sign-restrictions 
do not apply.
Source: author’s calculations.
In addition, my restrictions discard more controversial 
phenomena such as expansionary fiscal contractions see, 
e.g. Giavazzi, Jappeli and Pagano (2000) or the price 
puzzle. At the same time, with my choice of restrictions 
I avoid some issues often criticized in the structural VAR 
literature. For example the missing link between theory 
and a simple Cholesky decomposition, or the weak 
information provided by sign restrictions if one takes a 
too agnostic view on the identification of shocks see, e.g. 
Canova and Paustian (2011). Being too agnostic may have 
especially severe consequences if the relative variance 
of the shock of interest delivers a weak signal. The usual 
suspect here is the monetary policy shock. So the relatively 
large number of theory driven restrictions should a-priori 
lead to a good performance and reliability of my approach.
Although it is not of my primary interest, identifying 
a business cycle shock is crucial to adequately track the 
source behind the fiscal shocks, especially on the tax side. 
Otherwise I cannot disentangle whether a change in taxes 
comes from fluctuations in output or a tax shock see, e.g. 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) or Mountford and Uhlig 
(2009). Just as a remark, I do not differentiate between a 
demand driven or supply driven business cycle shock; the 
results will, however, provide an indication of the relevant 
driver in a particular regime.
2.3	 Estimation	procedure
Numerically, the penalty function approach is 
implemented in the following way. For more details, 
see the appendix, Uhlig (2005) or Mountford and Uhlig 
(2009).
First I define a penalty function:
      
f x( ) = { x if x 0100 *x if x 0
The function penalizes positive responses (negative 
for spending shock) in linear proportion and rewards 
negative (positive) responses, albeit with a weight 100 
times smaller than the positive (negative) penalties.
Next, I draw the parameters (B, Σ) from a Normal-
Wishart prior.
Let rj,a(z), z + 0,…Z be the impulse response of variable 
j, and σj its standard deviation of the first difference of the 
series for the same variable j. In addition, let ιj = -1 if j is 
the index of a variable x in the data vector, for instance 
the interest rate, and ιj = 1 otherwise. Then, the monetary 
policy impulse vector a4 is the one which minimizes the 
total penalty function Ψ(a), which penalizes positive 
impulse responses for output and inflation at horizons k = 0 
and k = 0, 1, 2, 3 ,4.
Ψ a( ) =∑
k=0
K
∑ f i j rj ,a k( )σ j
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟  
j  ∈
"Government  expenditure ''
"Government  revenues ''
"Government  debt ''
"Real  GDP ''
"GDP Deflator ''
"Interest  rate ''
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
Along the same lines, the tax impulse vector a2 is the 
one that minimizes the total penalty for positive impulse 
responses of debt and output. On the contrary, spending-
and business cycle impulse response vectors a1 and a3 are 
the ones which minimize a penalty function penalizing 
negative impulse responses of debt and output for 
spending shock, and output only for business cycle shock.
This penalty function is asymmetric insofar it 
punishes violations a lot more strongly than rewarding 
large and correct responses. Second, it is continuous in 
order to make the standard minimization procedure viable. 
Third, the penalty function punishes all deviations, but 
not equally. In its current form, even small violations of 
the signs are punished. However, larger deviations are 
punished more than smaller ones, and so there is also 
magnitude discrimination.
To draw inference from the posterior, I employ the 
Monte-Carlo method and take n draws from it. I set n = 20,000 
and keep n = 10,000 out of these in order to strike a balance 
between higher numerical accuracy and time consumption 
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from optimizing over the shape of the impulse responses. For 
each of these draws kept, I calculate the impulse responses 
and the (forecast error) variance decomposition, and collect 
them. Hence in total there are 10,000 draws for each point 
on an impulse response function, which allows me to easily 
calculate the 95% error bands.
2.4	 Data
The data sample consists of 6 variables: government 
expenditure, net taxes, government debt, real GDP, GDP 
deflator, and the short-term interest rate. Government 
spending includes both government consumption 
expenditures and gross investment, and net taxes are the 
current receipts less net transfers and net interest paid. On 
the nominal side I measure prices with GDP deflator and 
use the 3-month EONIA rate as the short-term interest 
rate. The three variables on the real side of the economy 
enter the VAR as logarithms.3For the pre-2002 period, the 
data have been backward extrapolated by the ECB and 
an EONIA-equivalent rate had been used for the short-
term interest rate. In addition for the fiscal variables, the 
data have been aggregated using the method of Eurostat. 
Further data description, including the extrapolating 
method used can be found in Paredes et al (2014).
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the data. 
Most of the data distributions are symmetric, with a high 
probability mass around the mean, and low tails. The only 
exception is the interest rate, with a standard deviation 
almost as high as the median. Hence the distribution is 
quiet disperse, possibly capturing the high variation 
in interest rate levels during the extreme periods of 
turbulence from monetary targeting in early 1980’s, and 
the zero-lower bound since the Great Recession.
Likewise, the contemporaneous correlations of the 
different variables are in line with the priors in the literature. 
Variables which have been identified in the literature as 
having strong positive correlation, such as output and 
government debt, output and GDP deflator, or government 
spending and debt, also have high (positive) correlations 
in my simple matrix below. Note the surprisingly high 
correlation between interest rate and government debt, at 
-0.93. It means that there are strong interactions between 
government financing and the monetary stance in the EA. 
When interest rate is low, a lot of new government debt is 
accumulated, and vice versa.
But so far, the discussion has only concentrated on 
the superficial relation between the variables. To get a 
better idea on the causal relation between them, I perform 
a sequence of one-and two-sided Granger causality tests. 
Results are reported in Table 3. A star (*) means that the 
statistic is significant at 10% level, and thus variable x 
Granger causes variable y. The relationships in bold are 
3 The data were obtained from the Euro Area Wide Model database 
of the ECB.
Table 2 
Data - descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Median
Std. 
deviation
Skew-
ness
Kur-
tosis
Obser-
vations
Real 
output 32.63 32.65 0.20 -0.35 1.73 144
Deflactor 1 1.05 0.27 -0.43 2.05 144
Interest 
rate 5.96 4.73 4.32 0.40 2.01 144
Govern-
ment 
debt
33.57 33.7 0.41 -0.46 2.26 144
Spending 33.51 33.47 0.15 0.13 1.62 144
Taxes 33.65 33.68 0.19 -0.41 1.84 144
Defla-
tor
Govern-
ment
Interest 
rate
Real 
output
Spen-
ding
Taxes
Govern-
ment debt 0.992 1 - - - -
Interest 
rate -0.93 -0.94 1 - - -
Real 
output 0.99 0.97 -0.91 1 - -
Spending 0.956 0.93 -0.87 0.97 1 -
Taxes 0.98 0.96 -0.89 0.99 0.94 1
the ones of particular interest since they represent the 
direct interaction between monetary and fiscal policies. 
The number of lags included in the estimation of the 
pairwise Granger causality test is 4 since the frequency 
of the data is quarterly. In the one-sided causality tests, 
I find sufficient evidence for Granger causality between 
the fiscal and monetary variables. In particular, the two 
fiscal variables (spending and taxes) Granger cause each 
other, as do interest rate and taxes. At the same time, I 
find that government debt Granger causes taxes, but that 
spending Granger causes debt. Hence, while spending 
decisions determine debt, debt acts as a constraint on the 
tax decisions. In the two-sided test, I however find that 
the bidirectional causal relation exists between interest 
rate and spending. In sum, even in the raw data (without 
imposing any structural relations), I find sufficient 
evidence of monetary-fiscal interactions. This serves 
as sufficient motivation for exploring further this joint 
relation in a structural model.
3. Results
The lag length test found the optimal length to be 2. 
I run 20.000 Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulations and 
save 10,000 for inference. These parameters are relatively 
standard in the literature and allow for sufficient draws 
Source: author’s calculations.
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in order for the routine to converge.4 I let the number of 
subdraws for sign restrictions to be 2,000 so that 10 draws 
in each subdraw are included. Once the algorithm has 
converged and the routine has completed, we calculate the 
impulse responses with 95% confidence intervals (in red), 
and the (forecast error) variance decompositions. The 
IRFs are reported in Appendix A5.
The discussion of the results is organized in the 
following way. Section 3.1 discusses the responses to fiscal 
and monetary shocks in the benchmark model. I continue 
by analyzing the fiscal multipliers for EA in Section 
3.2 and compare those to those found for the individual 
member states in 3.3 (and 3.9). In Section 3.4 I take a 
closer look the contribution of the shocks in explaining the 
fluctuations in each of my variables through forecast error 
variance decompositions. I combine all this information in 
determining the degree of monetary-fiscal interactions in 
3.5. The last five subsections are then dedicated to various 
extensions. First, I compare my estimates to the ones 
obtained in a model without debt in 3.6. Next, I evaluate 
the evolution of coefficients over time in 3.7. I compare 
my interaction results for the EA to the ones obtained for 
the US in 3.8. 3.9 is dedicated to the comparison of tax 
multipliers within EA, and 3.10 is dedicated to a series 
of important robustness checks (pure sign restrictions, 
alternative identification schemes, estimation in growth 
rates, and comparison of results to a model identified 
using a recursive scheme.
Before the discussion, I would like to introduce the 
concept of policy interaction I will be making use of 
throughout the subsequent sections. If fiscal and monetary 
policy exhibit a positive or negative correlation implying 
that one policy responds (strategically) to the actions of 
the other, I say that the two policies interact or coordinate. 
Going one level deeper, and following Muscatelli et al 
(2004), if the interaction is such that both policies are 
expansionary I define them as being compliments. If 
the two policies move in different directions they act 
as substitutes. Finally, the last level of policy analysis 
regards the responses of the two policies to innovations 
in output, as in Melitz (2002) and Muscatelli et al (2004). 
If the interest rate rises after a business cycle shock, I 
say that monetary policy acts in a stabilizing fashion. 
Likewise, if taxes rise or government spending falls, I 
equally say that fiscal policy enhances output stability. 
Since I superimpose, via my identification scheme, that 
taxes will always rise following a positive business cycle 
shock, the final outcome on the fiscal side will therefore 
depend on the sign and the magnitude of response of 
government spending.
4 For robustness purposes, we re-estimated the model saving 20.000 
draws, but the results were the same.
5 Burriel et al (2010) examine fiscal shocks in the EA using a 
traditional SVAR, but in their framework they focus on fiscal 
variables only, and do not use sign-restrictions to identify their 
shocks.
Judging from Appendix A on the impulse responses 
to all the four identified shocks, I find sufficient 
evidence for interaction between the two policies. In all 
cases, except for a tax shock, both the monetary policy 
and the two fiscal policies react, either in the same or 
in the opposite direction. Moreover, in all cases except 
for a tax shock, the correlation of the two fiscal policy 
responses is positive.
3.1	 Benchmark	monetary-fiscal	shocks
Digging a level deeper on the interaction (or 
coordination) between the policies, the findings are 
even more interesting. Commencing with the reaction of 
monetary policy to a spending shock in Table 4 shows that 
the two policies act as substitutes. Interest rates increase by 
about 0.2 percentage points to accommodate the demand-
side expansionary effects of the increase in spending. 
Note, however, that because of this strong monetary policy 
response, actual inflation does not increase very much as 
the response of interest rate is already accounted for in 
the actual inflation. Expected inflation, on the other hand, 
increases by more, as is indicated by the output response. 
This is probably the reason for why interest rate responds 
so strongly, since the expansionary effects from a rising 
output raise expected inflation, which triggers a strong 
reaction of the central bank.6As a result, fiscal expansion 
has been accompanied by a monetary contraction. This 
pattern is in line, for instance, with the New-Keynesian 
DSGE model of Corsetti et al. (2011), but differ from 
Mountford and Uhlig (2009). However, their estimates 
are based on data for US and over the period (1955:I to 
2000:IV), thus quite different to these.
In response to a tax increase, on the other hand, the 
response of monetary policy is not statistically significant 
at 95% level. The reaction of inflation is weakly positive, 
while that of debt, spending, and (to limited extent) output 
is negative. Remember that these are fiscal policies beyond 
the automatic stabilizers (which will be captured by the 
reaction of fiscal policy to a business cycle or monetary 
policy shock). Note also how the confidence intervals are 
larger for spending, output and interest rate following a 
tax shock compared to a spending shock. Taken together, 
the results indicate that spending decisions are truly 
discretionary and independent, which in turn trigger a 
solid reaction from the central bank. Taxes and tax shocks, 
on the other hand, depend intrinsically on the state of 
the business cycle, and respond passively to output. The 
variance decomposition results in Table 6 seem to confirm 
this pattern. This is additional evidence for why the two 
fiscal policies should be considered distinctively.
To sum up the discussion so far, I find evidence of two 
things. First, interest rate seems to respond to output insofar 
6 I have not imposed any sign restriction on monetary policy response 
to a spending shock, so this is entirely derived from the data.
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Table 3 
Granger causality tests
Causality relation
F-statistic
P-value ObservationsUnidirectional 
causality relations
Deflator-to-Government debt* 3.36 0.012 140
Government debt-to-Deflator 1.94 0.11 140
Interest rate-to-Government debt 0.68 0.61 140
Government debt-to-Interest rate* 3.3 0.01 140
Spending-to-Government debt* 2.2 0.07 140
Government debt-to-Spending 1.9 0.11 140
Taxes-to-Government debt 1.81 0.13 140
Government debt-to-Taxes* 4.67 0.002 140
Interest rate-to-Taxes* 4.43 0.002 140
Taxes-to-Interest rate 1.18 0.33 140
Spending-to-Real output 0.86 0.49 140
Real output-to-Spending* 4.21 0.003 140
Taxes-to-Real output 0.49 0.75 140
Real output-to-Taxes* 9.78 0.000007 140
Spending-to-Taxes 0.76 0.56 140
Taxes-to-Spending* 3.63 0.008 140
Causality relation
F-statistic
P-value Observationsbidirectional 
causality relations
Interest rate-to-Deflator* 4.66 0.002 140
Deflator-to-Real output* 2.51 0.05 140
Real output-to-Deflator* 2.95 0.02 140
Deflator-to-Spending* 3.3 0.01 140
Spending-to-Deflator* 2.1 0.09 140
Deflator-to-Taxes* 2.23 0.07 140
Real output-to-Government debt* 2 0.01 140
Government debt-to-Real output* 4.71 0.001 140
Taxes-to-Deflator* 1.98 0.1 140
Real output-to-Interest rate* 3.41 0.01 140
Interest rate-to-Real output* 4.88 0.001 140
Spending-to-Interest rate* 2.05 0.09 140
Interest rate-to-Spending* 2.36 0.06 140
Note: A star (*) means that the statistic is significant at 10% level, and thus variable x Granger causes variable y. The relationships in bold are the ones we are in particular interested in as 
they represent the direct interaction between monetary and fiscal policies. The number of lags included in the estimation of the pairwise Granger causality test is 4 since the frequency of 
the data is quarterly (so to capture the lagged annual relation).
Source: author’s calculations.
that movements in output change inflation expectations. 
Second, my analysis provides additional evidence that the 
two fiscal instruments should be considered separately 
and distinctively. Apart from having strategic interactions 
between them, they also provoke distinct responses in 
monetary policy. Hence, it is possible that the central bank 
discriminates between the two policies, since spending 
increases have stronger expansionary effects on output.
Next, let me turn to the transmission of monetary 
policy. Both fiscal policies react to the contraction caused 
by an interest rate rise, but in very distinct ways. While 
spending policy reacts as a compliment to a monetary 
contraction by also contracting, tax policy reacts as 
substitute by accommodating. Remember that no 
restrictions are placed on fiscal policy, so the responses 
are entirely data-driven. At the same time, debt seems to 
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Table 4
Shock 
identified
Spending Taxes
Government 
Debt
Output GDP deflactor Interest rate
Penalty method Impact Peak Impact Peak Impact Peak Impact Peak Impact Peak Impact Peak
Spending 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.0035 -0.0005 0.001 0.08 0.2
Tax n.s. n.s. 0.007 0.007 n.s. n.s. -0.003 -0.004 n.s. -0.001 n.s n.s.
Monetary policy n.s. -0.004 n.s. -0.0035 0.002 0.006 -0.0025 -0.0045 -0.001 -0.0015 0.2 0.23
Business cycle n.s. 0.004 0.01 0.012 -0.0025 -0.006 0.0045 0.006 n.s. -0.0025 0.18 0.39
Shock 
identified
Spending Taxes
Government 
Debt
Output GDP deflactor Interest rate
Penalty method Impact Peak Impact Peak Impact Peak Impact Peak Impact Peak Impact Peak
Spending 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.007 - - 0.004 0.005 0 0.002 0.08 0.28
Tax n.s n.s. 0.007 0.007 - - -0.0028 -0.0038 n.s. -0.001 n.s. n.s.
Monetary policy n.s -0.004 -n.s -0.0045 - - -0.0025 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 0.18 0.22
Business cycle n.s 0.003 0.009 0.013 - - 0.0042 0.0062 n.s. 0.0025 0.15 0.39
Shock 
identified
Spending Taxes
Government 
Debt
Output GDP deflactor Interest rate
Penalty method Impact Peak Impact Peak Impact Peak Impact Peak Impact Peak Impact Peak
Spending 0.003 0.003 n.s. n.s. 0.0015 0.0015 0.002 0.002 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Tax n.s. n.s. 0.0055 0.0055 -0.001 -0.0025 -0.001 -0.001 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Monetary policy n.s. -0.0035 n.s. 0.001 0.001 0.004 -0.0015 -0.0035 -0.0007 -0.0008 0.13 0.15
Business cycle n.s. n.s. 0.006 0.0065 n.s. n.s. 0.002 0.003 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Note: The left (vertical) column reports the shocks identified, and the right (horizontal) row are the variables responding to one standard deviation shock. The magnitudes are interpreted from the 
impulse response functions reported in Appendix A and B. N.S. means that the responses are not statistically significant at 95% level. Conversely, all reported values are significant at p=0.05.
Source: author’s calculations.
initially expand when net taxes drop, but then it recovers. 
Taken together it is highly probable that taxes initially 
respond because output contracts, following the monetary 
policy shock. Because taxes respond to business cycle 
movements (see variance decomposition of taxes), they 
fall significantly. However, the consequence is a surge 
in debt. Thus, in order to counteract this debt increase, 
spending also falls (after horizon 3). Output recovers, and 
inflation expectations turn positive. In this case, the fiscal 
authority seems to react in a passive way, first as a result 
of a contraction in output, and then to counteract the surge 
in debt. Muscatelli et al. (2004) reach the same conclusion 
for the US regarding the initial fiscal expansion following 
a monetary contraction, but do not find the strong counter-
reaction of fiscal policy further ahead in time in order to 
stabilize debt as we find for the EA.
Finally, I go one level deeper and discuss the 
degree of policy interaction when the shock is not 
engineered by any of the two authorities (i. e. spending, 
tax, or monetary), but comes from outside in the form 
of an economy-wide business cycle shock. In Table 
4, I again observe distinct responses of the two fiscal 
policies in relation to monetary policy. While tax 
policy complements the monetary policy contraction 
by increasing 0.0125%, spending substitutes (or 
counteracts) this contraction by increasing by 0.004%. 
Adding the two fiscal policy responses shows that the 
final fiscal stance is contractionary, since taxes rise 
more than spending, and so the fiscal policy acts as a 
compliment to monetary policy, just as in Muscatelli 
et al. (2004) for the US. Moreover, both fiscal and 
monetary policy reacts in a stabilizing way to output. 
However, as in Melitz (2002), I find that government 
spending (contrary to taxes) reacts in a destabilizing 
fashion to innovations in output since, via the demand-
side expansion, it attempts to push output further away 
from its steady state level. Net stabilization of the fiscal 
side therefore only occurs because of a larger reaction 
of taxes than expenditures.
3.2	 Fiscal	multipliers
To calculate the fiscal multipliers, I first need to 
convert the coefficients in Table 4 from responses of 
one standard deviation shock in spending and taxes to to 
multipliers. To do so, I transform the initial estimates of 
the variables in log-levels (output, spending and taxes) 
from elasticities into derivatives by multiplying them 
with the prevailing ratio of the responding and shocked 
variables. These transformed variables become “dollar 
deviations from trend” and can therefore directly be 
interpreted as multipliers (see e.g. Blanchard and Perotti 
(2002) or Kirchner, Cimadomo and Hauptmeier (2010)).
After conversion, I get that the spending multiplier 
for the full sample period is 0.60 and the tax multiplier 
for the same period is 0.50. First thing is that both 
multipliers are below 1 for the EA. This means that a 
smaller proportion of the public budget spending results 
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in macroeconomic expansion. Second, the spending 
multiplier is higher compared to the tax multiplier. 
This implies that spending rises are more effective in 
expanding output compared to tax cuts.
Another interesting finding is that as soon as I do not 
control for debt in my model, the fiscal multiplier increases. 
In the specification without debt, the spending multiplier 
is 1, meanwhile that of taxes remains at 0.50. This means 
that if I do not include the costs from a less sustainable 
public finance in my considerations of the expansionary 
effects from a spending increase, I might upward-bias my 
estimate by overstating its impact on output.
Investigating further in-depth whether those multipliers 
had evolved over time, I find the following. First, the 
spending multiplier is consistently higher than the tax 
multiplier. Second, spending policies are more effective 
in expanding output during less turbulent times when less 
uncertainty prevails. To put the numbers into perspective, 
while in the pre-2008 sample, the spending multiplier was 
0.8, it decreased to 0.5 in the sample up to 2010Q1, and 
then further to 0.42 in the sample up to 2011Q2. Taking 
into account that in the full sample, the spending multiplier 
was 0.6, this means that during uncertain times, such as 
during the financial-and sovereign debt crises, the effects 
of spending policies on output were significantly lower. On 
the other hand, during more ‘normal times’, such as in the 
pre-financial crisis world before 2008, or the post-sovereign 
debt crisis world after 2014, the expansionary effects from 
spending policies were much stronger. Hence, uncertainty 
plays a significant role in the efficacy of spending policies. 
Third, the tax multiplier has evolved in the opposite 
direction. It was higher during more turbulent compared to 
less turbulent times. While in the pre-2008 sample it was as 
low as 0.29, it increased to 0.375 in the sample stretching 
to 2010Q1, and even further to 0.41 in the sample up to 
2011Q2. Forth and final, during the latest sovereign debt 
crisis, the spending and tax multipliers became roughly 
equivalent and very low, with the spending multiplier at 
0.42 and tax multiplier at 0.41. This means that during the 
fiscal stress of 2011, it did not matter how the expansionary 
fiscal policy was executed, the macroeconomic effects were 
weak. Hence, our last finding is that during fiscal distress, 
the expansionary effect from fiscal policies is weak, no 
matter if the expansion was spending-or-tax driven.
Recent papers in the literature have emphasized the 
non-linear nature of fiscal multipliers during expansions 
(or normal times) and recessions. Using a regime-
switching SVAR, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) 
find that the multipliers in recessions can be up to 4 times 
higher than during expansions. Baum and Koester (2011) 
and Baum et al. (2012) find similar results for Germany 
and Japan. Similar discrepancies between the multipliers 
are also found in new-Keynesian DSGE model, such as 
Corsetti et al. (2010) and Erceg and Linde (2012). While 
I do not perform a full TVP-VAR estimation in this paper, 
I can effectively discriminate between calmer and more 
turbulent times since the Great Recession. My results 
confirm partially the results in the literature. While tax 
multiplier became much higher during the crises periods, 
the spending multiplier is higher during less turbulent (or 
normal) times. There might be several reasons for some 
of this discrepancy in results. We treat the two fiscal 
instruments as independent measures while several others 
only look at the total fiscal stance. Our time-varying 
exercise focuses on the period of zero-lower-bound 
(ZLB) of monetary policy while the previous studies 
capture mostly the pre-ZLB period. Lastly, because EA 
has a distinct fiscal set-up to most other countries, there 
may be significant differences in the multipliers owing to 
institutional differences with other countries such as the 
US, Japan, or even Germany.
To conclude this section, I find that spending increases 
is more effective in expanding the (short-term) EA output 
than tax decreases. However, the effects are highly non-
linear. During period of high uncertainty, the tax-oriented 
expansionary policies become marginally more effective, 
while during tranquil periods, fiscal policies focused on 
spending are significantly more effective (up to 3 times). 
Lastly, during times of fiscal distress, both policies are 
equally ineffective in expanding output, with spending 
increases half as effective compared to the pre-2008 sample.
3.3	 Spending	multipliers	across	the	Area
One valid criticism of the identification strategy 
applied so far is that I assume that the economic 
structure between the countries in the EA are the same, 
which produces an identical fiscal policy innovation 
across, and which interacts with a common monetary 
policy of the ECB. Nonetheless, the recent sovereign 
debt crisis in Europe showed that the countries of the 
union remain very diverse in their economic structure, 
and thus also the transmission of policies. Therefore 
aggregation of behavioural equations across countries 
that have different parameters may produce a bias in the 
aggregate model.
To overcome this problem, I will compare my 
estimates for the aggregate EA for those found for 
the 4 largest economies inside it: Germany, France, 
Italy, and Spain (Alloza et al., 2017). The sample 
on which these estimates were based on is identical 
to the one used in this paper, stretching from 1980-
2015. Moreover, the identification of fiscal shocks is 
based on the identification strategy of Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002), which is similar to ours. In addition, for 
robustness purposes they re-run the same model but 
using local projection method as their identification 
strategy. The only difference with ours is that they do 
not include monetary shocks in their model. However, 
since the focus in this section is on the distribution or 
heterogeneity of fiscal shocks across the EA, we can 
omit the common monetary policy for the moment.
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The first thing to note from Table 5 is that the spending 
multiplier indeed varies significantly across countries. While 
in Germany spending policies are very effective and generate 
an equiproportional increase in GDP, on the other end in Italy, 
it results in a decrease in GDP. Nonetheless, all multipliers 
are strictly below or equal to 1, which is in line with my 
qualitative findings for the Area as a whole, and in line with 
more conservative multipliers found in the literature. Spain 
seems to be the closest to the average EA estimate.
Table 5 
Spending multipliers in the Euro Area
Euro 
Area
Germany France Italy Spain
Full sign 
restrictions 0.60
− − − −
Restrictions a 
la Blanchard 
and Perotti
 − 1 0.30 -0.10 0.50
Identification 
via local 
projections
 − 1 0.40 -0.10 0.50
Empirical 
literature 
(1985-2010)
0.60 0.40 1.60 0.10 0.30
Source: author’s calculations.
Second, there is very little difference in estimates 
using the two identification methods. The individual 
country estimates can therefore be interpreted as firm and 
representative of the effectiveness of spending policies in 
those countries.
Third, roughly speaking, we can say that the 
individual country weights in the aggregate multiplier 
are different. While Italy has a low weight, being treated 
as almost an outlier in the spectrum of multipliers, the 
weights of Spain and Germany seem to be higher. One 
implication of this is that the effectiveness or success of 
spending policies in the Area will mostly depend on their 
effectiveness in boosting GDP in Germany, Spain and to 
some extent in France.
A comparison to the spending multipliers found in 
the empirical literature (Comission, 2012 and Cleaud 
et al., 2014) show that my findings on the individual 
country multipliers and the conclusions drawn from a 
comparison to the estimated area-level aggregate are in 
line with those. Bearing in mind that their sample period 
is shorter (1985-2010), which excludes the important 
periods of oil shocks and sovereign debt crises, and that 
the identification strategy is not as robust as in the case 
of this paper, Germany and Spain remain as the heaviest 
weights in the aggregate multiplier. The only difference is 
that both country multipliers are lower, at 0.4 for Germany 
and 0.3 for Spain, while that of France is significantly 
higher at 1.60. The EA wide multiplier found in this paper 
is, nevertheless, very much in line with that found in 
the literature. Hence my estimates can be considered as 
robust and in general representative of the developments 
in a large share of the Area, despite the ex ante individual 
heterogeneities in the economic structures of the different 
countries. In the remaining part of the analysis I will again 
concentrate on the area-wide estimates since that is the 
main focus of the paper.
3.4	 Forecast	error	variance	decomposition
The fiscal shocks are the strongest short-and medium-
term drivers of fluctuations in EA output, besides the 
business cycle shock. Together, they account for around 
60% of the variation in output. Monetary policy shock 
only plays a larger role in the medium-run.
Turning to the fiscal variables, not unsurprisingly, 
spending shocks explain the majority of the variation in 
spending. This is in line with the vision that spending 
decisions are discrete and therefore less influenced by 
other economic factors. Variation in taxes, on the other 
hand, are majorly explained by tax and business cycle 
shocks. In total these two explain between 80-90% of the 
variation in taxes over all horizons. Hence, different to 
spending, for tax decisions, the position in the business 
cycle at that particular time of the decision matters. In 
addition, this seems to provide further evidence that the 
spending and tax policy decisions are taken independently, 
and are considerate of different factors.
Turning to the monetary side, monetary policy shock 
explains the majority of the variation in interest rate. Only 
in the medium-run, does the business cycle shock matter, 
even if to a limited extent. Again, the position in the cycle 
matters for monetary policy decisions as far as it provides 
guidance on the macroeconomic forecast, and thus plays a 
role in the medium-run.7
Maybe the most interesting aspect of this exercise is to 
understand the drivers of government debt. While maybe 
it is not surprising that business cycle shock matters for 
debt variation over the cycle, a very interesting finding is 
that monetary policy matters even more for government 
debt, and its importance increases over the horizon. 
While in the first quarter after the shock, it explains 16% 
of the variation (and ranked first), it increases to 22% 
after the 20th quarter (still ranked first). On the other 
hand, spending matters little for government debt, and 
taxes matter more albeit less than monetary policy. This 
is additional evidence that monetary policy matters for 
fiscal decisions, via the debt channel, and even more so 
than the fiscal shocks independently. Interest rate level 
matters a lot in determining the debt repayment burden, 
and possibly the reason why it is crucial for explaining the 
variation in debt level.
7 For prices, unsurprisingly, monetary policy shock is the most 
important in explaining its variation. Taxes only play a role in the 
medium-run, or from the 20th quarter on.
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3.5	 Monetary-Fiscal	interactions
My analysis so far has provided firm evidence of 
monetary-fiscal interactions since 1980’s in the EA. 
Impulse response analyses have shown that central bank 
reacts to changes in fiscal policy, and vice versa.
Table 6 
Variance Decompositions: Specifications with debt
Variables Horizon Spending Tax
Business 
Cycle
Monetary 
Policy
Spending 1 52 2 1 1
4 50 4 2.5 2
8 45 7 6 4
20 28 12 12 13
40 25 13 12.5 17.5
Net Taxes 1 2 41 51 0.5
4 4 38 45 7
8 7 35 42 9
20 12 32 40 10
40 13 31 38 13
Gov. debt 1 10 21 7 16
4 8 25 15 15
8 8 26 18 16
20 8 15 14 22
40 12 11.5 15 22
Output 1 30 32 40 17
4 27 30 37 17.5
8 25 28 32 20
20 20 22 25 23
40 20 20 23 22
Deflator 1 3 4 2 17
4 6 7 4 19
8 8 10 8 22
20 12 14 14.5 21.5
40 15 16 17 21
Interest 1 3 4 4 38
Rate 4 6 9 10.5 32
8 7 12 14 30
20 8 12 16 28.5
40 10 13 16 28
Note: Posterior means of the percent of forecast error variance attributed to the four shocks.
Source: author’s calculations.
However, the reactions are different depending 
on whether it is a spending-or tax shock. Hence, the 
monetary authority discriminates between the two 
policies, as their effects on output are different.Moreover, 
variance decomposition has shown that monetary 
policy determines fiscal policy stance insofar that it is 
determinant for the government debt level and repayment 
burden, and thus plays a crucial role in determining the 
budgetary books of the government.
On a deeper level, I find that the nature of monetary-
fiscal interactions depends on shocks that hit the economy 
and the fiscal measure that one considers. If one considers 
the interaction between spending and monetary policy, 
then they act as substitutes for the spending, monetary 
policy, and business cycle shocks. If one considers 
interaction with taxes, on the other hand, then the two 
behave as compliments for spending-and business cycle 
shocks, and as substitutes for a monetary policy shock. 
However, if one adds the two fiscal policies together and 
look at the net stance, then for spending and monetary 
policy shocks, the two behave as substitutes, while for a 
business cycle shock they act as compliments. For a tax 
shock, however, the monetary policy does not react and 
thus I cannot determine any interaction between them.
Lastly, both fiscal and monetary policy react in a 
stabilizing way to output. However, I find that government 
spending (contrary to taxes) reacts in a destabilizing 
fashion to innovations in output since, via the demand-
side expansion, it attempts to push output further away 
from its steady state level. Net stabilization of the fiscal 
side therefore only occurs because of a larger reaction of 
taxes than expenditures.
3.6	 How	important	is	public	debt?
Next, I wish to understand the role that government 
debt plays in the identification of my model, and the 
degree to which debt constraints the interactions. There 
is a widespread view that the three (two fiscal and one 
monetary) policies affect each other via the impact they 
have on debt, and thus on the macroeconomy. I wish to 
validate that view in our model. To do so, I compare our 
benchmark model to one where I exclude government debt. 
I then proceed to compare the IRFs, the fiscal multipliers, 
and the forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD). 
I need to consider all these estimates since they provide 
information on different aspects of the model, and thus 
also the quantitative importance of debt in our bencmark 
model.
First and foremost, I find clear evidence of omitted 
variable bias in the estimates when I exclude government 
debt from our model. Comparing the upper and lower half 
of Table 4, impulse response estimates in the lower part for 
variables such as taxes, output or interest rate is different 
(and mostly higher) than when I control for government 
debt. Similarly, comparing FEVDs in Table 6 with debt and 
Table 7 without debt, most of the estimates become upward 
biased when I exclude debt from the S-BVAR model. In 
the case of output variation, even the qualitative aspect 
change when we exclude debt. While for the specification 
with debt, the three most important shocks for explaining 
output variation are spending, taxes and business cycle 
shocks, when we exclude debt in the model, the importance 
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of spending shock dissappears and the majority of variation 
is explained by tax-and business cycle shocks.
The last exercise compares the fiscal multipliers. As in 
the previous cases, the multipliers turn much higher when 
we exclude government debt. However, the difference 
is even bigger compared to IRFs and FEVDs since the 
size of the shocks also change. Therefore, the spending 
multiplier rises from 0.6 in the model with debt to 1 in 
the model without. Likewise, the tax multiplier rises from 
0.125 in the model with debt all the way up to 0.58 in the 
model without it. The difference is huge. To conclude, our 
comparative exercises have shown that government debt 
plays an important role in the identification of monetary-
fiscal interactions in our S-BVAR. Failing to recognize the 
debt channel of fiscal-and monetary policies will result in 
misinterpretations of the estimates.
Table 7 
Variance Decompositions: Specifications without debt
Variables Horizon Spending Tax
Business 
Cycle
Monetary 
Policy
Spending 1 50 1 0 1
4 49 2 2 2
8 48 8 5 5
20 40 16 13 15
40 34 16 15 20
Net Taxes 1 5 32 52 1
4 12 35 49 8
8 14.5 38 48 10
20 15.5 32 41 13
40 17.5 30 38 14
Output 1 10 60 45 27
4 39 58 45 27
8 37 55 42 29
20 29 40 30 29
40 29 31 27 28
Deflator 1 2 1 1 23
4 6 5 5 25
8 10 9 11 28
20 16 22 21 28
40 20 28 24 25
Interest 1 3 5 5 39
Rate 4 8 12 12.5 37
8 9.5 15 16 32
20 11 17 18 30
40 11 17 18 30
Note:Posterior means of the percent of forecast error variance attributed to the four shocks.
Source: author’s calculations.
3.7	 Time-variation
During my sample period, the EA economy went 
through a number of turbulent episodes and a number 
of structural changes in policy. In particular, following 
the subprime crisis and collapse of Lehman brothers, 
ECB started to engage in unconventional expansionary 
monetary policy. The fiscal authorities had to bail out 
many of the banks that were affected by the financial 
crisis, and many governments engaged in expansionary 
fiscal policies in order to counteract the contractionary 
effects from the crisis. Then, following the sovereign debt 
concerns and the surge in sovereign risk premia for several 
countries in the EA, the ECB launched its full-blown 
unconventional monetary package (including the QE from 
March 2015), and many governments had adopted fiscal 
austerity measures. In sum, my sample captures periods 
of both conventional and unconventional monetary policy, 
and expansionary as well as austere fiscal policy. In order 
to test whether these policy changes had distinctive 
structural impacts on the economy, and examine the way 
in which the two policies jointly responded to these, I will 
perform an expanding window estimation, augmenting 
the sample size at each stage with more time-series 
observations. Table 8 explains the different dates and 
sample sizes I have selected to estimate.
Table 8 
Sub-sample selection
Time-
interval
Sam-
ple 
size
Monetary 
policy
Fiscal 
policy
Motivation
1980Q1-
2007Q2 114
Conven-
tional
Conven-
tional
Represents the 
normal or non-
turbulent period in 
our sample
1980Q1-
2010Q1 125
Uncon-
ventional
Expan-
sionary
Includes the 
financial crisis 
period in the EA 
and the official end 
to recession
1980Q1-
2011Q2 130
Conven-
tional
Expan-
sionary
Covers the early 
sovereign debt crisis
1980Q1-
2015Q4 130
Conven-
tional
Conven-
tional
Runs since the 
introduction of euro 
and fiscal discipline 
of the Maastrich 
criteria
1980Q1-
2015Q4 144
Uncon-
ventional Austere
Captures the entire 
sovereign debt crisis 
period and the first 
year of QE
Source: author’s calculations.
The first period that I estimate is before the onset 
of the subprime crisis and the beginning of the Great 
Recession. I consider this period as standard and wish 
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to identify the transmissions and interactions during 
‘normal’ times. The second period includes the first years 
of the Great Recession, and is just after the date when 
the ECB officially stated that the EA economies were out 
of the recessionary region. The third period includes the 
beginnings of the sovereign debt crisis, when markets 
started doubting the Greek public finances. Finally, the full 
sample includes the entire sovereign debt crisis period, and 
the full-blown unconventional monetary policy artillery. 
Note that I am not attempting to identify non-conventional 
monetary policy shocks and determine the effectiveness 
of unconventional measures. I simply want to see whether 
the nature of interactions between the two authorities had 
changed and if the transmission to the real economy had 
been dramatically altered during this period. For the last 
subsample, I do not perform an expanding window, but 
rather wish to test whether the introduction of the Euro 
in 1999 and the fiscal discipline through Maastricht 
criteria changed the nature of monetary-fiscal interactions, 
aligning them more compared to the earlier period.
Tables 9 to 11 report coefficients of the IRFs, both 
on impact and peak. The first thing to note is that many 
of the IRFs look very similar in the different subsamples. 
The peak impacts are very close to each other, even if 
the trajectory of the IRFs throughout the horizon might 
qualitatively look somewhat different. Hence, the model 
seems to capture the deep structural links between 
monetary and fiscal policies in a robust way since they do 
not vary excessively over different sample lengths. Said 
that, there are some differences in the magnitudes of the 
impacts over time.
For a spending shock, for instance, the impact on 
government debt and the variance of the shock was largest 
during the turbulent period of the financial crisis and the 
immediate aftermath. For output, net taxes, deflator and 
interest rate, on the other hand, the largest responses were 
during the pre-Great Recession (GR) period when the 
uncertainty in the economy was the lowest.
For a tax shock, on the other hand, the largest 
response of output, and deflator was during the GR, while 
that of government debt was before the GR. Lastly, for a 
monetary policy shock, the largest impact of interest rate 
movement on spending, net taxes, government debt and 
output was during the Great Recession, while for interest 
rate and the deflator, it was in the period before.
Another pattern I found is that the time variation in 
impact of a shock was the least for taxes. In other words, 
comparing the three shocks, the least variation in the 
peak impact we found was for the tax shock. Only three 
out of the six variables had some time-variation in the 
peak impact, compared to all six variables for the other 
two shocks (spending and monetary policy). This is 
another suggestion that tax shock, different to spending 
and monetary policy, depends on other indicators such 
as output and cannot de considered as truly independent 
policy decision.8
Lastly, one can think that the introduction of the Euro 
in 1999 and the application of fiscal discipline as a part 
of the Maastricht package changed the way fiscal policy 
was conducted, and its interaction with monetary policy. 
Despite national discretion in fiscal policy setting, the 
Maastricht fiscal discipline aligned them to an extent 
and reduced their individual variation. Moreover, the 
common monetary policy aligned them even further. 
Therefore, we should expect to see differences in impacts 
since the introduction of the Euro in 1999. However, our 
results for the period 1999:I-2015:IV do not differ much 
to the entire sample period, or the other sub-samples. 
The peak responses are almost the same as the ones for 
the full sample. This means that the nature of interactions 
in EA is deeper and more longer-term beyond a single 
event. Thus, it is very possible that the process of 
aligning national fiscal policies was a process that began 
much earlier, simply consolidating when the common 
monetary policy was introduced. Thus the interactions 
we are examining here are of a structural nature spanning 
over several decades.
3.8	 Comparison	to	the	US
The empirical literature on monetary-fiscal interactions 
is rather thin, even more so for the EA. In order to put 
our results for EA into perspective, I wish to compare the 
estimates with the ones obtained for the US. The results 
for US are obtained from Gerba and Hauzenberger (2014). 
I will use the results for the time-invariant S-BVAR model, 
and the identification scheme for shocks is the same. This 
in turn allows for a direct comparison between their and 
our findings. These are reported in Appendix C, Table C.1. 
The coefficients, labelled as n.s. mean that they are not 
statistically significant at 95% level.
Basically, the impact is clearly different between the 
two, and these differ depending on the shocks. For EA, 
the (peak) impact of a spending-and a business cycle 
shock is beyond doubt more profound, while for the US, 
it is the (peak) impact of a tax shock. This last finding is 
very much in line with what we have discussed so far. Tax 
decisions in the EA are not discretionary and depend on 
the state of the business cycle. Hence the impact is also 
limited. In the US, on the other hand, the Congress takes 
tax decisions and so there is more space for independent 
manoeuvre. Spending shock, on the other hand, generates 
a much heavier response of the monetary policy and 
taxes, and is possibly the reason why spending has a more 
profound impact in EA. Business cycle swings are also 
heavier in the case of EA (possibly because there are 
multiple business cycles within the common EA one), and 
8 Possibly the institutional difficulties in the EA limit the capacity 
of the government to take independent decisions on taxes, or to 
respond in a timely fashion to changes in the economy.
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Table 9 
Time-varying estimates for spending shock
Variables Type
1980Q1-
2007Q2
1980Q1-
2010Q1
1980Q1-
2011Q2
1999Q1-
2015Q4
1980Q1-
2015Q4
Spending Impact 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005
Peak 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005
Net Taxes Impact 0.0035 0.002 0 0.002 0.004
Peak 0.0065 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004
Gov. debt Impact 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Peak 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004
Output Impact 0.0038 0.003 0.0025 0.0015 0.003
Peak 0.004 0.003 0.0025 0.0025 0.0035
Deflator Impact 0 0 0 -0.0005 -0.0005
Peak 0.002 0 0 -0.00075 0.001
Interest Impact 0.08 0 0 0.004 0.08
Rate Peak 0.35 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Note: Impulse response estimates for a spending shock in different subsamples
Source: author’s calculations.
Table 10  
Time-varying estimates for tax shock
Variables Type
1980Q1-
2007Q2
1980Q1-
2010Q1
1980Q1-
2011Q2
1999Q1-
2015Q4
1980Q1-
2015Q4
Spending Impact 0 0 0 0 0
Peak 0 0 0 0 0
Net Taxes Impact 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Peak 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Gov. debt Impact -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Peak -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Output Impact -0.002 -0.0025 -0.0022 -0.0026 -0.0028
Peak -0.002 -0.0032 -0.0037 -0.0038 -0.004
Deflator Impact -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 0 0
Peak -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
Interest Impact 0 0 0 0 0
Rate Peak 0 0 0 0 0
Note: Impulse response estimates for a tax shock in different subsamples
Source: author’s calculations.
Table 11 
Time-varying estimates for monetary policy shock
Variables Type
1980Q1-
2007Q2
1980Q1-
2010Q1
1980Q1-
2011Q2
1999Q1-
2015Q4
1980Q1-
2015Q4
Spending Impact 0 0 0 0 0
Peak 0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.0045
Net Taxes Impact 0 0 0 0 0
Peak 0 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
Gov. debt Impact 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Peak 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.006
Output Impact -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.001 -0.0022
Peak -0.004 -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.004 -0.005
Deflator Impact -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Peak -0.002 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.003 -0.0018
Interest Impact 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.17 0.2
Rate Peak 0.3 0.25 0.25 0.17 0.25
Note: Impulse response estimates for a monetary policy shock in different subsamples.
Source: author’s calculations.
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thus the importance of cyclical swings or the particular 
position in the business cycle is also wider.
For a monetary policy shock, on the other hand, the 
difference is not very clear. While the impact on output 
is more profound in the EA, the reaction of spending and 
taxes are stronger in the case of the US. Maybe because 
of this stronger reaction of fiscal policies to a monetary 
policy shock, the effect on output is milder, and thus why 
we observe a smaller peak impact.
A comparison of the multipliers in Table 13 shows 
that while similar for spending, they are very different 
for taxes. The tax multiplier is much higher in the case of 
US, with the (peak) impact at 1.65 compared to 0.76 for 
the EA. That is more than the double. At the same time, 
while the tax multiplier is higher in the case of the US, it 
is the spending multiplier in the case of the EA. Hence, 
in terms of comparative advantages, standard Keynesian 
expansionary policy seems to be more effective in the EA, 
and standard non-Keynesian in the case of the US.
To summarize, the impact of shocks is clearly different 
between the EA and the US, and these differ depending on 
the shocks. For EA, the (peak) impact of a spending-and 
a business cycle shock is beyond doubt more profound, 
while for the US, it is the (peak) impact of a tax shock. For 
a monetary policy shock, on the other hand, the difference 
is not very clear. However, the reaction of fiscal policies 
to a monetary policy shock is stronger in the US. Lastly, 
in terms of comparative advantages, standard Keynesian 
expansionary (or spending-oriented) policy seems to be 
more effective in the EA, and standard non-Keynesian 
(tax-oriented) in the case of the US.
3.9	 Briefly	on	the	tax	multiplier	across	the	Area
The number of studies on Europe that specifically 
incorporate tax multipliers is much scarcer compared to the 
ones for spending, either because the data on revenues does 
not stretch sufficiently far back to be used in time-series 
analyses, data on government revenues are not of good 
quality or standardized across countries, or because the 
identification of a tax shock is not as straight forward as 
for spending. The only available study that includes- and 
systematically compares tax multipliers across Euro Area 
is one prepared by the European System of Central Banks 
(Kilponen et al, 2015) and reported in Table 12. The report 
summarizes the multipliers found in the VAR literature, so I 
also report the original references for those studies.
Note that while the multipliers are all extracted from 
VAR models, the identification methods differ, they do 
not include a monetary policy shock and the sample 
periods are not perfectly matching. Therefore while 
the numbers are clearly comparable and informative, 
some of the cross-country variation may be due to the 
aforementioned differences. Said that, this variation 
should be limited as the economic structure underpinning 
those multipliers is consistent.
Table 12 
Tax multipliers across the big four in Euro Area
Studies Country Sample period
Tax 
multiplier
Gerba (2017) Euro Area 1980:I-2015:IV 0.50
Baum and Koester 
(2011) Germany 1976:I-2009:IV 0.65
Biau and Girard 
(2005) France 1978:I-2003:IV 0.1
Giordano et al. (2007) Italy 1982:I-2004:IV -0.16
De Castro (2005) Spain 1980:I-2001:II -0.05
Note: Gerba (2017) study refers to the estimate found in the current paper. All studies, 
except for Euro Area, do not include the Great Recession period, but that of Germany 
and France includes the Great Stagflation. In the original studies, the multiplier is defined 
as an increase in net taxes. However, since in the current paper, we are interested in the 
economic impact from a reduction in net taxes, at the same time as the models report 
symmetric multipliers (i.e. the absolute value of the impact from a tax change is the same 
no matter if taxes are increased or reduced), I have therefore just inverted the sign from 
the reported values in Kliponen et al. (2015) in order to make them comparable to the 
EA tax multiplier in this paper.
Source: author’s calculations.
Overall, I find that except for Germany, the other 
three countries have a lower tax multiplier compared to 
the Euro Area estimate. At the same time, while that of 
Germany and France are positive, that of Italy and Spain 
are negative. For the latter two this might be because the 
taxes were so low that actually increases in net taxes might 
lead to a boost in output rather than vice versa, or because 
increasing taxes for some sectors might improve resource 
allocation and boost efficiency and, subsequently, output. 
The first explanation might also, inversely, be valid for 
Germany, since taxes are already very high there so that 
a reduction in those will result in a boost in output. Since 
those estimates do not include the Great Recession period, 
we might expect that the individual tax multipliers, just as 
for the overall Euro Area, have increased since the 2007-
08 crisis, and opportunities for a tax-led fiscal boost have 
simply increased.
Compared to the spending multipliers for those 
individual countries in Table 5, I find the same pattern 
as for the Euro Area. The spending multiplier is through-
and-through higher for all countries compared to the tax 
one, even for Italy, who has negative multipliers for both 
spending and taxes. Thus the conclusion that spending 
increases are more effective in boosting output than tax 
reductions is universal for Europe and does not only hold 
for the whole Area, but also for its big four members. 
Hence, qualitatively the conclusions we draw for the Area 
as a whole also hold for its biggest members states. That is 
not surprising since their weights are also proportionally 
higher in the Area aggregates. Quantitatively, however, we 
do see heterogeneities amongst the individual countries, 
which highlights the need to also consider the specificities 
of each member state when determining the final impact 
of fiscal policies and the optimal monetary-fiscal mix.
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3.10	 Robustness	checks
To corroborate my findings so far, I perform a series 
of robustness checks on the benchmark specification for 
the complete sample. In particular, I test the validity of 
my previous results by altering the sign restrictions in the 
identification scheme, by estimating the model in growth 
rates, and by comparing my findings to results from a 
plain recursively identified (Cholesky) model. I discuss 
them in further detail below.
3.10.1 Pure sign restrictions
Arias et al. (2014) have shown that in some cases, the 
penalty function approach might generate biased estimates 
by adding unintended or unanticipated sign restrictions 
in the estimation procedure. Thus, the approach might 
involve additional restrictions on variables that are 
seemingly unrestricted. To check the consistency of the 
original estimates, I re-estimate the same model with the 
same sign restrictions, but substituting simply the penalty 
method for the rejection method, where all draws that do 
not satisfy the full identification scheme are discarded. 
That method is therefore not susceptible to imposing 
unintended restrictions, and is also less information 
intensive. The results from this estimation are reported in 
the third and last segment of Table 4.
In general, the discussion and conclusions 
regarding interactions from the main text remains. The 
only difference is that some of the estimates are lower 
using this method, or that they are not fully significant 
at the strict 95% interval, but are of a similar size and 
impact if the confidence interval is relaxed to 80-85%. 
In terms of individual impulse responses, those of 
deflator are slightly weaker using the rejection method, 
while interest rate is slightly less responsive to the other 
shocks (besides its own). The responses of interest rate 
are significant at 85% interval. In terms of multipliers, 
they are in general the same. The conclusion from the 
benchmark results that the spending multiplier is higher 
than the tax one remains. The difference is that the 
spending multiplier is slightly higher when applying 
rejection method (0.67 compared to 0.60 with penalty 
method), while tax multiplier is somewhat lower (0.18 
compared to 0.50 with penalty method).
To summarize, the conclusions on monetary-
fiscal interactions and fiscal multipliers are robust to 
the estimation method. There is sufficient evidence of 
interaction between the two policies in an asymmetric 
manner at the same time as spending increases are 
more effective in boosting demand and output than tax 
reductions in the Euro Area even when we use the pure 
rejection estimation method. The only difference is that 
magnitudes of some estimates are slightly lower, while 
spending (tax) multiplier is higher (lower).
3.10.2 Alternative identification scheme
One way to check the consistency of the results 
discovered in the previous sections is to re-estimate the 
models but excluding government debt. However, I have 
already discussed these results and the impact of omitted 
variable bias on the estimates. I found an upward bias in 
the estimated impact on output, as well as in the responses 
in the other fiscal-and monetary policy variables, in 
particular for the spending shock.
But, another way of validating the results is to 
estimate the model with the same variables, but alternative 
sign restrictions. In particular, for the most controversial 
one, the tax shock, we estimate the tax shock specification 
removing the sign restriction on debt (i.e. a positive 
response of tax and a negative response of output, but no 
restriction on debt).9
I find striking similarity with the results discussed 
above when I exclude government debt from the model. In 
this case, I also find that our estimates become biased. In 
the model without (with) a sign restriction on government 
debt, the fall in spending and debt is statistically 
insignificant (significant at -0.005 and -0.002), the fall in 
output is -0.004 (-0.001), and that of deflator is -0.001 (rise 
of 0.0005). Hence, by not controlling for the effects of tax 
policy on debt, the impact on output and inflation are over-
estimated, while that of spending and debt underestimated.
Moreover, the fiscal multipliers are very different. 
In the identification scheme including restrictions on 
debt, the multiplier is 0.125, while it is 0.57 for the one 
excluding that restriction. It is clear that the multiplier is 
overestimated by a factor larger than 4 if the effect of tax 
changes on debt are not taken into account.
Thus, the fiscal policy-debt channel is very important 
to include if one wishes to obtain unbiased estimates. An 
important conclusion from this exercise is that not only do 
we need to consider monetary policy when we estimate 
the effects of fiscal policy, but we also need to include 
debt and provide a rationale for debt dynamics if we wish 
to obtain a complete and unbiased picture of the effects of 
fiscal policies.
3.10.3 Estimation in growth rates
To check the robustness of my benchmark results, 
I performed the sign-restriction estimation with data 
expressed in annual growth rates. The unit root tests 
showed that my data have a I(1) process. Thus, following 
the hotly debated topic of whether SVAR models with I(1) 
data should be estimated in levels or growth rates, we re-
estimated our model in Section 4.1 but with all variables 
expressed in annual growth rates (except for the interest 
rate). The estimation procedure is still based on the 
penalty function method and we use the complete sample 
9 For the sake of space and focus, I do not report the full IRFs for 
the alternative identification scheme. Nevertheless, the figures and 
results can be obtained from the author.
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period from 1980Q1-2015Q4.10Both the qualitative and 
the quantitative results remain.
Following a positive spending shock (of 0.75%), 
taxes increase in order to finance some of the spending 
rise, however only at 0.5%. As a result, government debt 
increases by 0.4% and remains persistently above the 
trend for almost 40 quarters. The fiscal expansion results 
in a GDP increase of 0.30%, and an inflation of 0.1%. As a 
reaction to this expansion, interest rate increases by 0.4%, 
which considerably above the rise in inflation.
I find a very similar evolution for a tax shock as in 
the benchmark model. A monetary policy shock of 0.1% 
has significant impact on taxes. They fall by 0.65%, while 
spending remains more or less unchanged. The tax-based 
fiscal expansion results in a government debt expansion 
of 0.4%. At the same time and following the interest rate 
increase, inflation falls immediately by almost 0.3%, and 
output by 0.4%.
To end and following a business cycle shock (0.8% 
increase in output), taxes rise by 1.5% (as the tax base has 
increased) and spending rises by 0.4%. Since the rise in 
taxes is higher than that of spending, the net fiscal effect 
is contractionary. That is why government debt falls (by 
0.6%). Faced with a rising inflation (0.15%), the monetary 
authority tightens their policy by increasing the policy rate 
by 0.5%.
To finish, my original findings remain when I estimate 
the model in growth rates instead of levels. Hence, the 
method is robust to the data specification in the model.
3.10.4 Comparison to a recursive scheme
The last robustness check concerns the way I identify 
the shocks. To validate the robustness of my benchmark 
results, I re-estimate the same model but identify shocks 
based on a simple agnostic Cholesky identification 
approach. Hence, I use the same Bayesian estimation 
procedure and set lag equal to 2 for the endogenous 
variables. I also use a Normal-Wishart prior and correct for 
the degrees of freedom as in the previous section. Lastly 
the order of the variables entering the model is the same 
as before (spending first, followed by taxes, government 
debt, output, deflator, and interest rate last).11
Using the recursive scheme, the identification of the 
model is much weaker. Most of the IRFs are not statistically 
different from zero (except for the shocks). Second, 
even in the cases where they are, the magnitudes of the 
response-variables are much smaller. The only similarity 
I find with the previous identification procedure is that the 
link between taxes and interest rate remains. Following 
a tax shock, interest rate rises by 0.2%, and following a 
10 For the sake of space and focus, I do not report the full IRFs for 
the growth-rate estimated model in the paper. Nevertheless, the 
figures and results can be obtained from the author.
11 For the sake of space and focus, I do not report the full IRFs for 
the Cholesky-identified model in the paper. Nevertheless, the 
figures and results can be obtained from the author.
monetary policy shock, taxes rise by 0.006%. In contrast, 
the link between spending and interest rate dissappears. 
Interest rate does not respond to spending shocks, and vice 
versa. That is not the case in the sign-restriction version of 
the model, where the link between spending and interest 
rate is tight.
To conclude, this exercise shows that the structural 
identification scheme consisting of sign restrictions is 
strictly superior to the simple Cholesky decomposition. 
The identification is more robust, the impact of shocks 
stronger, and the interpretation of the impulse responses 
is structural and with theoretical foundations. All in all, 
all the robustness exercises show that the method and 
identification scheme applied in the paper is robust and 
consistent with the underlying economic theory.
4. Conclusion
The joint analysis of monetary and fiscal policy in the 
EA sheds novel light on the role and effects of (common) 
fiscal policy and their interactions with monetary policy 
since 1980. I find sufficient evidence for a common fiscal 
policy reaction in the EA, both in terms of (endogenous) 
impulse responses and shock decompositions. I also find 
significant evidence for (implicit) interactions between 
fiscal-and monetary authorities. Said that, the nature of 
interactions depends very much on the shocks that hit 
the economy. While for a spending and monetary policy 
shock they act as substitutes, they act as compliments for 
a business cycle shock. At the same time, the way the two 
fiscal policies interact with monetary policy is also different 
and independent of each other. On the effectiveness of 
fiscal policies, I find that the spending multiplier is higher 
than the tax multiplier. Nonetheless, this efficacy has 
changed over time, and while the spending multiplier has 
decreased since the onset of the Great Recession, that 
of taxes has increased. I also show that it is crucial to 
include government debt in the estimation of monetary-
fiscal interactions. Failing to recognize the debt channel 
will result in misinterpretation of the monetary-fiscal 
estimates. To conclude, there are considerable differences 
in the nature of monetary-fiscal interactions between 
the EA and the US. Not only are the impulse responses 
to different shocks significantly different between the 
two economies, but also the fiscal multipliers vary a lot. 
Standard Keynesian (or spending-oriented) fiscal policy is 
more effective in expanding output in the Euro Area while 
tax reductions are more effective in the US.
Even if this is one of the first attempts to structurally 
understand the joint behaviour of fiscal-and monetary 
policy in the EA, there are multiple ways in which this 
analysis can be improved and extended. Recognizing that 
the EA economies have undergone significant structural 
changes since 1980, it would be purposeful to estimate 
the interactions within a time-varying parameter VAR, as 
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Gerba and Hauzenberger (2014) have done for the US. 
Another interesting extension would be to estimate the 
interactions using a strategic interactions set-up based 
on theoretical models on monetary-fiscal interactions 
(such as e.g. Leeper (1991) or Davig and Leeper (2011) 
to determine leaders and followers in policy setting. 
Alternatively, one could cast these policies in a jointly 
estimated model for EA member states and the EA as 
a whole (possibly in a G-VAR). This would permit to 
investigate the level of fiscal spillovers in the monetary 
union, and whether having a common monetary policy has 
lead to an alignment in fiscal policies across the union. 
This would allow for a formal test of the policy spillover 
hypothesis initially proposed as a part of the extended 
OCA theory.
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Appendix A
Model	estimation	results	in	levels 
Estimations	including	government	debt
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Figure A.1 
IRFs to a 1 std. increase in spending, in levels and for the full sample
1. Impulse response of SPENDING 2. Impulse response of TAXES
3. Impulse response of GOV_DEBT 4. Impulse response of REAL_GDP
5. Impulse response of DEFLATOR 6. Impulse response of INTEREST_RATE
Source: author’s calculations.
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Figure A.2 
Impulse responses to a 1 std. increase in taxes. The model is estimated in levels and for the full sample
Figure A.3 
Impulse responses to a 1 std. increase in the policy rate (monetary policy shock). The model is estimated in levels and for the full sample
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3. Impulse response of GOV_DEBT 4. Impulse response of REAL_GDP
5. Impulse response of DEFLATOR 6. Impulse response of INTEREST_RATE
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Figure A.3 (continued) 
Impulse responses to a 1 std. increase in the policy rate (monetary policy shock). The model is estimated in levels and for the full sample
Figure A.4 
Impulse responses to a 1 std. increase in output (business cycle shock). The model is estimated in levels and for the full sample
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Figure A.5 
Impulse responses to a 1 std. increase in spending. The model is estimated in levels and for the full sample
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5. Impulse response of DEFLATOR 6. Impulse response of INTEREST_RATE
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Figure A.4 (continued) 
Impulse responses to a 1 std. increase in output (business cycle shock). The model is estimated in levels and for the full sample
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Figure B.2 
Impulse responses to a 1 std. increase in taxes. The model is estimated in levels and for the full sample
Figure B.3 
Impulse responses to a 1 std. increase in the policy rate (monetary policy shock). The model is estimated in levels and for the full sample
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Figure B.4 
Impulse responses to a 1 std. increase in output (business cycle shock). The model is estimated in levels and for the full sample
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
(Unidades)
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.004
0.000
0.004
0.008
0.012
0.016
0.020
(Unidades)
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.010
0.008
(Unidades)
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.006
0.005
(Unidades)
Source: author’s calculations.
3. Impulse response of REAL-GDP 4. Impulse response of DEFLATOR
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1. Impulse response of SPENDING 2. Impulse response of TAXES
3. Impulse response of REAL-GDP 4. Impulse response of DEFLATOR
Figure B.3 (continued) 
Impulse responses to a 1 std. increase in the policy rate (monetary policy shock). The model is estimated in levels and for the full sample
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Figure B.4 (continued) 
Impulse responses to a 1 std. increase in output (business cycle shock). The model is estimated in levels and for the full sample
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Appendix C 
Technical details of the model
SVAR model
I follow Uhlig (2005) and Mountford and Uhlig 
(2009) in defining our SVAR model. Further details can 
be found in the appendix. Formally, a reduced-form VAR 
is given by:
Y
t
 = B
0
+B1Yt–1+ B2Yt–2…+ BjYt–j+ut (3)
Where Y
t
 is an mx1 vector of data at date t = 1– j,…
..T, B
0
, is a constant of size mx1, Bj are mxm coefficient 
matrices and u
t
 is a one-step ahead prediction error with 
Σ = E[u
t
´u
t
], its variance-covariance matrix. The problem of 
identification is to translate the one step ahead prediction 
error, u
t
, into economically meaningful (or fundamental) 
shocks, v
t
. Formally, if v is the vector of fundamental 
innovations, then its relation to u is represented by a 
matrix A:
u
t 
= Av
t 
(4)
Note that the j:th column of A represents the 
immediate impact, or impulse vector of a one standard 
error innovation to the j:th fundamental innovation, which 
is the j:th element of v. In addition, I assume that Σ is 
positive and definite and that the identity matrix to be the 
variance-covariance matrix of v. Our immediate aim is to 
characterize all possible impulse vectors. To do so we use 
the observation that any two decompositions Σ = AA´ and 
!A !A'  have to satisfy:
!A = AQ  (5)
for some orthogonal matrix Q, QQ´ = I.
In the VAR literature, identification usually 
proceeds by identifying all m fundamental shocks and 
so characterizing the entire A matrix. However, here we 
identify at most four fundamental shocks. However, I 
am interested in indentifying at most four fundamental 
shocks: spending, taxes, monetary policy, and business 
cycle. Hence, we need to characterize an impulse matrix 
[a1, a2, a3, a4] of rank four rather than all A. This is 
accomplished by imposing sign restrictions on the impulse 
responses identified in 1. This is the same as identifying 
four out of six columns a∈Rm  of the matrix A. Note that 
by construction, the covariance between the fundamental 
shocks v
t
1, v
t
2, v
t
3, v
t
4 corresponding to a1, a2, a3, a4 is zero. 
In other words, the shocks are independent.
We define their properties below.
Let xi, i =1,…m be the normalized eigenvectors of 
Σ and λi,i = 1,…m be the corresponding eigenvalues. In 
addition let a be a vector. Then there are coefficients αi, 
i = 1,…m ( Σ i=1m α i2 = 1 ) such that:
a = Σ i=1m α i λi( )xi  (6)
Vector a is thus an impulse vector, i. e. it can be 
shown that there exists A such that AA´ = Σ and so that a 
is a column of A. In this vector, there are m – 1 degrees of 
freedom in picking an impulse vector, and so they cannot 
be arbitrarily long.12
Next, we wish to compute an impulse response given 
the impulse vector a. Let a = [a´, 0
1,m(i –1)]´, B is the VAR 
coefficient matrix, and
  Γ =
′B
Im l−1( ) 0m l−1( ),m
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
and compute rk,j = (Γ
ka)j, k = 0,1,2,… to get the response 
of variable j at horizon k. The variance of the k-step 
ahead forecast error of the impulse vector a is obtained 
by simply squaring its impulse responses. Moreover, 
summing over all aj, with aj being the j-th column of some 
matrix A (A;A = Σ) delivers the total variance of the k-step 
12 Cauchy-Schwarz inequality implies that ! a !≤ Σ i=1m λi ! xi !2 .
Source: author’s calculations.
5. Impulse response of INTEREST_RATE
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ahead forecast error. Finally, we assume that the errors u 
are independent and normally distributed.
Given an impulse vector a the following thing is to 
calculate the part of the one-step ahead prediction error u, 
which is attributable to shocks proportional to that vector. 
We call it va∈R , (or the scale of a shock attributable to a) 
if there exists a matrix a with AA´ = Σ, of which a is the j-th 
column for some j so that v a = (A–1u)j.v 
a is calculated using 
the following two equation system, where b∈Rm
0 = Σ − a ′a( )b
1= b 'a
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
The solution to this system is:
va = b´u (7)
This is the scale of the shock at date t in the direction 
of the impulse vector a, and v
t
aa is a part of u
t
 which is 
attributable to that impulse vector. In other words, b is the 
appropriate row of A–1.
To conclude we wish to define variance 
decomposition. Consider the k-step ahead forecast 
revision E
t
[Y
t+k
] – E
t–1[Yt+k] due to the arrival of new 
information at date t. The fraction φa,j,k of the variance of 
this forecast revision for variable j explained by the shocks 
in a is given by:
φa, j ,k =
(ra, j k( ))2
Σ i=1m (ri, j k( ))2  (8)
where j picks the entry corresponding to variable j. 
With these tools one can perform forecast error variance 
decomposition.
Estimation procedure
Numerically, the penalty function approach is 
implemented in the following way. First we define a 
penalty function:
f x( ) = x100 * x
if x 0
if x 0
The function penalizes positive responses (negative 
for spending shock) in linear proportion and rewards 
negative (positive) responses, albeit with a weight 100 
times smaller than the positive (negative) penalties.
Next, we draw the parameters (B, Σ) from a Normal-
Wishart prior. For our purposes here, before we go on to 
explain the calculation of posteriors, we will re-write the 
generalised VAR system in (3) as a stacked system with 
lag l:
Y = XB + u (9)
Where X
t
 = [Y´
t – 1, Y´t – 2, …. Y
´
t – l]´ is the lagged VAR 
system, Y = [Y1, Y2,…. YT]´ is the matrix of current 
endogenous variables, X = [X1, X2,…. XT]´ is the matrix 
of past endogenous variables, u = [u1, u2,…. uT]´ is the 
forecast error, and B = [B1, B2,…. Bl]´ is the matrix of 
VAR coefficients. The Normal-Wishart distribution is 
parameterized by a mean coefficient matrix B  of size 
mlxm, a positive covariance matrix S of size mxm and a 
positive definite matrix N of size mlxml. Given the priors 
B0 , N0, S0, and v0, the posteriors (vT, NT, Bˆt , ST) are:
vT = T + v0
NT = N0 + X´X
Bt = Nt−1 N0Bˆ0( )
St =
v0
vt
S0 + 
T
vt
Σˆ + 1vt
Bˆ − Bˆ0( )' N0NT−1X 'X Bˆ − Bˆ0( )
With weak priors, i. e. N
0
 = 0, v
0
 = 0, and S
0
 and bˆ0  
arbitrary, then:
vT = T
BˆT = Bˆ
ST = Σˆ
NT = X´X
Let r
j,a
(z), z + 0,… Z be the impulse response of variable 
j, and σj its standard deviation of the first difference of the 
series for the same variable j. In addition, let ιj = –1 if j is 
the index of a variable x in the data vector, for instance 
the interest rate, and ιj = 1 otherwise. Then, the monetary 
policy impulse vector a4 is the one which minimizes the 
total penalty function Ψ(a), which penalizes positive 
impulse responses for output and inflation at horizons k 
= 0 and k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4.
 
 
 Ψ a( ) =∑
k=0
K
∑ f i j rj ,a k( )σ j
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
 
j  ∈
"Government  expenditure ''
"Government  revenues ''
"Government  debt ''
"Real  GDP ''
"GDP Deflator ''
"Interest  rate ''
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
Along the same lines, the tax impulse vector a2 is the 
one that minimizes the total penalty for positive impulse 
responses of debt and output. On the contrary, spending-
and business cycle impulse response vectors a1 and a3 are 
the ones which minimize a penalty function penalizing 
negative impulse responses of debt and output for spending 
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shock, and output only for business cycle shock. In other 
words, the objective is to find the impulse vector for each 
draw from the posterior. All accepted draws are kept and 
their statistics based on these.
This penalty function is asymmetric insofar it 
punishes violations a lot more strongly than rewarding 
large and correct responses. Second, it is continuous in 
order to make the standard minimization procedure viable. 
Third, the penalty function punishes all deviations, but 
not equally. In its current form, even small violations 
of the signs are punished. However, larger deviations 
are punished more than larger ones, and so there is also 
magnitude discrimination.
As in Uhlig (2005), to perform the numerical 
minimization of Ψ, we were required to parameterize the 
space of vectors (αj)
6
j = 1 of unit length for each draw from 
the posterior. The parameter values used are:
 
=
cos 1( ) cos 2( ) cos 3( )
cos 1( ) cos 2( ) sin 3( )
cos 1( ) sin 2( )
sin 1( ) cos 4( ) cos 5( )
sin 1( ) cos 4( ) sin 5( )
sin sin1( ) 4( )
where (γ j ) j=15 ∈R5.
To draw inference from the posterior, we employ 
the Monte-Carlo method and take n draws from it. We 
set n = 10,000 and keep n = 1,000 out of these in order 
to strike a balance between higher numerical accuracy 
and time consumption from optimizing over the shape 
of the impulse responses. For each of these draws kept, 
we calculate the impulse responses and the (forecast 
error) variance decomposition, and collect them. Hence 
in total there are 1,000 draws for each point on an impulse 
response function, which allows me to easily calculate the 
95% error bands.
Table C.1 
Comparison with the US
Variables
Impulse
response
EA US
Spending shock
Spending Impact 1 1
Peak 1 1.02
Net Taxes Impact 0.6 0
Peak 1.17 0.15
Output Impact 0.8 1
Peak 1 1
Deflator Impact n.s. 0.005
Peak 0.4 -0.005
Interest Impact 0.09 0.02
Rate Peak 0.29 -0.03
Tax shock
Spending Impact n.s. -0.05
Peak n.s. -0.12
Net Taxes Impact 1 1
Peak 1 1
Output Impact -0.6 -0.95
Peak -0.76 -1.65
Deflator Impact n.s. 0.02
Peak 0.2 0.005
Interest Impact n.s. -0.15
Rate Peak 0 -0.15
Monetary policy shock
Spending Impact n.s. -0.13
Peak -0.02 -0.13
Net Taxes Impact n.s. 0.1
Peak -0.023 0.2
Output Impact -0.014 -0.05
Peak -0.025 0.01
Deflator Impact -0.005 -1.2
Peak -0.01 -1.2
Interest Impact 1 1
Rate Peak 1.1 1
Business Cycle shock
Spending Impact n.s. 0
Peak 0.75 0.13
Net Taxes Impact 2.25 0.2
Peak 3.25 0.6
Output Impact 1 1
Peak 1.5 1.3
Deflator Impact n.s. -0.01
Peak 0.625 0.02
Interest Impact 0.15 0.13
Rate Peak 0.38 0.15
Source: author’s calculations.
